Abstract. R. K.. Meyer once gave precise form to the question of whether relevant implication can be defined in any modal system, and his answer was 'no'. In the present paper, we extend S4, first with propositional quantifiers, to the system S4re+; and then with definite propositional descriptions, to the system S47r+'^. We show that relevant implication can in some sense be defined in the modal system S4TT+
definite propositional descriptions of the form ipA; and that the -> of R cannot be so defined without the use of definite propositional descriptions. (Edwin Mares suggested that we add definite propositional descriptions to the system. ) We proceed as follows. §2 extends S4 to the propositionally quantified logic S47r+. §3 extends S47r+ to the logic S4n+' p , by adding definite propositional descriptions. §4 generalises Urquhart's [21] semilattice semantics for R_, the pure implicational fragment of R. §5 gives precise sense to the claim that the connective -> of R^ can be defined in S47T+"' or in S4n+. §6 proves that the -> of R_+ can be defined in S4n+' p . §7 proves that -> cannot be defined in S4rc+. §8 generalises and comments on §7's result. And §9 concludes with some open problems and some methodological remarks. §2. S47T+: S4 with propositional quantifiers, \fp and 3p. We assume that we have a modal language with a countable set of propositional variables, PV = {p\,P2,... }; connectives V, -> and • ; and propositional quantifiers \/p and 3p. We use p, q, r, ... as meta-linguistic variables ranging over PV, and A, B, C, ... as meta-linguistic variables ranging over formulas.
Here we extend Kripke's [15] semantics for S4 and its cousins to our propositionally quantified language. A frame is a 3-tuple, F = (W, <, wo), where W is a set (of possible worlds); < (the accessibility relation) is a binary relation on W; and w 0 (the actual world) e W. Given a frame, a proposition is a subset of W. A model is a pair M -(F, V), where F is a frame and V is a function assigning a proposition to every propositional variable. Given a model M, a proposition P and a propositional variable p, M[P /p] is the model just like M except that it assigns P to p. An S4-frame is a frame for which < is reflexive and transitive. And an S4-model is a model whose underlying frame is an S4-frame.
Given a model M and a formula A, the proposition M{A) assigned by M to A is defined by the following clauses:
(i) M(p) = V(p) for p e PV; (ii) M((B V C)) = M(B) U M(C); (hi) M ( -U B ) = W -M 0 B ) ; (iv) M(DB) = {w : (Vw' > w)(w' e M{B))}; (v) M(VpA) = f\{M\P/p](A)
: P C W } ; and (vi) M(3pA) = U{M[P//>]U) : P C W } .
A is true at the world w iff w e M(A). A is true in the model M iff wo € M(^4).
Kripke [15] proves that if A is quantifier-free, then A e S4 iff A is true in every S4-model. (See Hughes and Cresswell [9] for soundness and completeness theorems for K, T, K4, B, S4.2, S5 and others.) DEFINITION 1. S4TT+ is the set of formulas true in every S4-model.
Fine [4] defines S4?r+ as well as the systems K7r+, Tn+, K4w+, Bn+, S4.2jr+, and S5TT-(-. These systems are to be distinguished from S47T, KJT, Tn, K4rc, Bw, S4.2w, and S5n, which result from adding natural quantification axioms and rules to the unquantified axiomatisations. (See also Bull [2] on S4rc and S5TT.) Here are some facts about L,n+ and ~Ln, where L ranges over {S4, K, T, K4, B, S4.2, S5}.
(1) LTT+ and LTT are conservative extensions of L, and L»r C k + , (2) S5JT+ = S5TT + 3p(p&Vq(q D • (/> D q))) and is decidable. See Fine [4] and Kaplan [11] .
(3) Fine and Kripke independently showed that Kn+, Tre+, K4rc+, B7T+, S4.27T+, and S4TT+ are recursively isomorphic to full second order classical logic (a slightly weaker result occurs in Fine [4] ). The stronger result can be shown by simplifying the intuitionistic strategies of Kremer [12] , or as noted by Kremer [14] , by adapting the relevance logic strategies used there. A published proof is given by Kaminski and Tiomkin [10] .
In the terminology of Kremer [14] , borrowed from Henkin [6] , the Lrc+'s embody the primary interpretation of propositional quantifiers relative to Kripke's semantics, while the Lrc's embody the secondary interpretation. Henceforth we do not concern ourselves with the LTT'S. It is in an extension of S47r+ that we will define relevant implication. §3. S4n+' p : S4n+ with definite propositional descriptions. Here we extend the semantics for S4;r+ to give a semantics for expressions of the form ipA, which are to be read as 'the proposition p such that A\ We add the propositional description operator ip to the language, together with a grammatical rule: if A is a formula and p is a propositional variable, then ipA is a formula. We call such formulas definite propositional descriptions.
A grammatical aside: in the standard treatments of definite individual descriptions of the form ixA, i combines with an individual variable and a formula to form a singular term. In the case of definite propositional descriptions, everything is of the same logical type: i combines with a propositional variable and a formula to form & formula. Given its grammatical similarity to \/p and 3p, we can take ip to be a new propositional quantifier.
3.1.
A first attempt at a semantics for definite propositional descriptions. In keeping with §2's semantics, we want to provide a clause defining M(ipA), for a model M, a propositional variable p and a formula A. Our treatment of definite propositional descriptions will be Fregean, in the sense of Carnap [3] , and motivated by Frege [5] : if there is a unique proposition P such that M[P /p] \= A, then M(ipA) -P; otherwise, M{ipA) is some designated proposition.
To make this precise, we make room for designated propositions in our semantics. An extended frame (e-frame) is an ordered pair (F, D), where F is a frame, and D, the designated proposition, is a subset of W. . S4-e-frames and S4-e-models are defined in the obvious way. Given an e-model N a proposition P and a propositional variable p, N[P//»] is the e-model just like N except that it assigns P to
P-
Given an e-model N and a formula A, the proposition, N(v4), assigned by N to A is defined by the following clauses: (i)-(vii) as in §2, with 'M' everywhere replaced by 'N'; and (viii) If there is a unique proposition P such that wo PROOF. Suppose that N = (W, <, wo, D, V) is an S4-e-model and that for some w G W, wo ^ w. Assume that ipA is proper. So there is a unique proposition, P, such that wo G ~N[P/p](A). Let P' = PU{w} and P" = P -{ w } . By induction on the complexity of formulas we have the following: (5))).
So wo is in both N[P' jp](A) and N[P" /p](A)
. This contradicts our assumption that ipA is proper, since P' ^ P". H
The upshot is that, in most S4-e-models, all definite propositional descriptions are improper. The problem can be diagnosed so as to lead to a revision of §3.1's semantics. Suppose that F = (W, <, wo) is a frame in which some world w ^ w 0 . Suppose that (F, D) is an e-frame extending F. Finally, suppose that P and Q are distinct subsets of W, such that (Vw > w 0 )(w G P iff w G Q). The root of the problem is this:
No S4-e-model based on the e-frame F can distinguish between P and Q.
The reason for this is that no S4-e-model can tell what is going on at worlds inaccbssible to wo.
This is made precise in Theorem 3. There is one more thing to iron out: if ipA is proper, we still might have several candidates for ~N(ipA), although all of these candidates are identified. We resolve this by choosing the smallest of these candidates. §3.3 makes this precise. Truth at a world and in an e-model are defined as in §3. and Bn+' p , we alter the definition of Wo, since the accessibility relation is no longer both reflexive and transitive. First we define w < m w', in three steps: (1) w <o w' iffw = w'; (2) w <" + i w' iff (3w")(w <" w" and w" < w'); and (3) w < u w' iff (3w)(w <" w"). Then Wo =df {w G W : wo <" w}. Below are some facts about L,n+' p , where L ranges over {K, T, K4, B, S4, S4.2, S5}.
(1) The following formulas are valid in LTT+' / ' in the present sense, but not in the sense of §3.1:
p is recursively isomorphic to full second order classical logic. Conjecture: S5w+' / ' is decidable. (3) ipA is true at a world w G Wo iff either w e P n Wo where P is the unique proposition, modulo «o, such that w 0 6 N[P/p](A); or there is no unique proposition P such that wo G N[P /p](A), and w G D. This raises two related points, (i) Like • , ip is intensional: the truth, at the world w, of ipA depends on the truth, as p ranges over the propositions, of A at other worlds. This is noLso for \/p and 3p. In some sense, ip is even more intensional than D: unlike OA, the truth at w of ipA may depend upon the truth of A at worlds that are inaccessible to w. (ii) There is a de re-de dicto issue here. Whether ipA is true at the world w depends in part on whether ipA is proper from the point of view of the actual world not from the point of view of w. In other words, ignoring, for the moment the designated proposition, ipA is true at world w iff de re, i.e., at the actual world wo, ipA is proper and de dicto, i.e., at the world w, ipA is true.
(4) Ln+' p is not closed under the rule of necessitation, though L and hn+ are. Consider the minimally true formula:
p . The reason: if N is an e-model then N U ) n W 0 = {w 0 }. §4. A generalised semantics for R^. We assume that we have a relevance language with the set, PV, of propositional variables, and with a binary connective, ->. (It is convenient to have the same set PV as for our modal language.) R-» is defined and axiomatised in Anderson and Belnap [1] .
Urquhart [21] 
Given a c-model M, the formula ,4 is true at the point u iff u G M(/4). ^4 is Jrwe irt ?/;e c-model M iff ^4 is true at 0. Urquhart [21] proves that A G R^ iff A is true in every c-model.
We can generalise this semantics so that we can interpret formulas of the language of R^ in the S4-e-frames of §3. (An analogous generalisation to that given below can be given for the S4-frames and S4-models of §2, rather than the S4-e-frames and S4-e-models of §3. Theorem 6, below, goes through in either case.) In order to so interpret these formulas, we must provide a clause defining N(B -* C) in terms of N(2?) and N(C), where N is an S4-e-model. First, some definitions. (Routley and Meyer [18] make similar use of a ternary relation.)
Given an S4-e-model N and a formula A in the language of R^, the proposition N(A) assigned by N to A is defined by the following clauses:
(
i) N(/>) = Y(p) for each p e PV; (ii) N U ->B) = (N(>4) -* N(5)
). Truth at a world and in an e-model are defined as in §3.1.
THEOREM 6 (Soundness and completeness). A G R^ iff A is true in every S4-emodel.

PROOF. ( = > ) : By induction on the length of proof of A. (•*=):
The canonical c-model provided by Urquhart [21] is an S4-e-model, if we take 0 to be the actual world; if we define < so that u < v iff u = (u o v); and if we let D be any proposition. So if A $ R^, then A is false in some S4-e-model. H
The fact that the formulas of R^ can be interpreted in our S4-e-frames allows us in §6, below, to define -> in terms of -i, V, • , Vp, 3p and ip. §5. Defining one logic's connectives in another logic. Here we make precise the claim that we have defined one logic's connectives in another logic. §5.1 specifies what it is to define a new connective in a given logic. §5.2 partially specifies what it is for that new connective to be "the same as" a particular connective from a different logic.
Defining new connectives. Consider the following "definitions" of new connectives, in the language of quantified modal logic: (ADB)= if hAVB); {A^B)= d[ n(A DB). @A= df V P n(ADp).
These definitions can be thought of as specifications of functions on the space of formulas. On this interpretation the functions &, D, -3 and @ are meta-linguistic entities, not new pieces of the object-language's vocabulary.
Not every function on the space of formulas intuitively counts as a connective. Consider the function that takes all formulas with an odd number of propositional variables to p\ and that takes all formulas with an even number of propositional variables to pi-We would hardly think of this function as a connective. Definition 8, below, characterises those functions that are connective-like. Theorem 9 provides an alternate characterisation of connective-like functions. DEFINITION 
. , G") is connective-like.
In §6 we will define -> in S4n-\-ip . This will implicitly rely on the composability theorem.
Identifying connectives across logics.
Suppose F is a binary connective-like function on the space of formulas in the language of S4re+' / ' and that F is intended to represent -+. Given this intention, F induces the following one-one map, G, from formulas of the relevance language to formulas of the modal language: Definitions 11 and 12 generalise these intuitions. DEFINITION 11. Suppose that L and L' are propositional logics, with or without propositional quantifiers, formulated for languages with the set, PV, of propositional variables. Suppose that the only primitive connective of L is the n-ary connective *. Let the L-formulas (L'-formulas) be the formulas in the language of L (L'). Suppose that F is an «-ary function on the space of L'-formulas. Let G be that function from L-formulas to L'-formulas for which
G{p) = p, for propositional variables, p; and
G(A -+ B) = F(G{A),G(B)).
Suppose that L, L' and * are as in Definition 11. The * of L is definable in L' iff there is an «-ary function on the space of L'-formulas that succeeds in representing the * of L in L'.
We can now give a precise statement of our main results: Given an S4-e-model N and a formula A, we can think of A as playing two semantic roles: it names the proposition N(^4); and it makes a claim about the model. For example, the formula [14] takes advantage of the same ideas.
In light of §4.2, we take A and B to name the same proposition if they name equivalent propositions. Given an equivalence class {P, Q, R , . . . } of propositions, it is useful to focus on a particular representative of that class, namely PHWo(= Q n Wo = R n W o . . . ) . Henceforth, we think of the formula A as naming not NU), but NoU) = NU) n W 0 .
Finally, the table's blank entries are those of no particular interest. 6.2. Table 2 : further definitions of connectives. Table 2 omits the fourth column  of Table 1 . In Table 2 , we use the following abbreviations, where * is any n + 1-place connective: PROOF. By a straightforward appeal to the definitions in Tables 1 and 2 Theorem 20 is in some ways broader and in some ways narrower than the result of Meyer [17] . Theorem 20 is broader than Meyer [17] . First, Meyer considers only definitions of -> as modalised truth functions, while Theorem 20 concerns definitions much more broadly conceived. Second, Meyer considers defining -> in unquantified modal systems, while we consider defining -> in propositionally quantified modal systems. And third, Meyer places stronger restrictions on the behaviour of the newly defined connective -K in effect, he insists that, for a definition to have succeeded, the -> V & -• fragment of the modal logic L be equal to the ~ V & -» fragment of the relevance logic, where -> and ~ are identified. But we insist only that the -> fragments be equal.
Theorem 20 is narrower than Meyer [17] . Meyer puts very weak conditions on the propositional modal system L: they are (1) that L contain all of the classical propositional tautologies; and (2) (2) The relevance logic with the closest affinity to S4 has been taken to be Anderson and Belnap's E rather than R. Indeed, the pure implicational fragment for E is motivated in part by a natural deduction system which combines a natural deduction system for the -3 of S4 with a natural deduction system for the -> of R. (Carnap [3] considers the proposals of Russell [19] and [20] and of Hilbert and Bernays [7] , and compares them to the Fregean proposal.) These proposals agree regarding formulas that contain only proper descriptions. In our definition of -> ( §6.2, Table 2 ) the only pertinent definite propositional descriptions are proper in every model. So our definition of -> should work in the presence of any well-motivated treatment of definite proposi
